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There is growing interest among development policymakers in taxation, 
both as a crucial source of revenue for development and because taxation 
is central to economic growth, redistribution and broader state-building and 
governance goals. This paper explores the direct impact of donor supported 
tax reform efforts; the indirect impact of aid and related donor policies on 
domestic tax effort; the potentially perverse effects of tax-related conditionality; 
and the impact of broader donor policies including global tax arrangements. 
It makes detailed recommendations about future donor support for tax reform.
Strengthening the impact of 
tax reform
The last few decades have seen the 
emergence of a global tax reform agenda, 
supported by donors and local tax 
professionals, and resulting in signiﬁ cant 
convergence of tax policy and administration 
across a range of developing countries. 
However, formal changes in tax regimes have 
led to relatively modest gains in terms of 
revenue mobilisation and improved practice, 
and they have been hard to sustain. Tax reform 
is politically difﬁ cult: it encounters strong 
resistance from vested interests, but mobilising 
potential winners is hard. Policymakers need 
to do more to foster local ownership and 
be opportunistic in engaging with sources 
of local political support for reform. They 
should look for ways to build support and 
weaken likely resistance by emphasising 
equity, transparency and inclusive process. 
They could do more to foster links between 
taxation and broader governance objectives. 
For example greater equity in enforcement, 
and transparency about tax-expenditure 
linkages could encourage collective action 
and bargaining, in place of fragmented rent 
seeking. There should be more focus on visible 
taxes on income and property, and on informal 
sector and subnational taxation, which have 
a direct impact on large numbers of people. 
Encouraging inclusive reform processes and 
civil society engagement could be important 
as well as fostering administrative cooperation 
across government departments, with the aim 
of enhancing performance and potentially 
providing a catalyst for broader improvements 
in state capacity.
Linkages between aid, 
incentives and tax collection
There is growing concern about the indirect, 
unintended impact of aid on tax systems, 
including the risk that aid may reduce 
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incentives for domestic tax collection. 
However research has produced divergent 
results, suggesting that while aid may 
contribute to lower tax efforts in some 
contexts, this relationship is neither simple 
nor universal. For example, donor assistance 
can have positive impacts on tax collection 
through effective technical support or the 
pressures that result from conditionality. 
More nuanced, context speciﬁ c investigation 
is needed, recognising that much aid is 
not an effective substitute for tax; that the 
quality of institutions will inﬂ uence aid/tax 
relationships; and that aid is only one factor 
in shaping tax effort, alongside domestic 
politics. Recognising that the relationship 
between aid and tax effort is likely to be 
context speciﬁ c, policymakers should be alert 
to the risks of undermining local tax effort, 
especially in aid dependent countries with weak 
institutions; but they should avoid assuming 
that the impact of aid is necessarily negative.
The impact of tax-related 
conditionality
Conditionality is one of the few tools available 
to donors to generate pressure for reform 
and manage risk. However, highly intrusive 
and detailed conditionality risks undermining 
local ownership and policy processes. While 
there is some evidence that conditionality 
can have positive impacts, its effectiveness 
is heavily dependent on domestic political 
support for reform. Where this is lacking, 
change may be superﬁ cial, with variable, 
sometimes negative, longer term outcomes. 
Conditionality will only be effective if desired 
outcomes can be monitored, if donor 
demands are coordinated, and if sanctions 
are applied when conditions are not met. 
There is scope to improve the design and 
implementation of tax conditionality, based on 
realistic and appropriate performance targets 
and indicators. These should be compatible 
with longer term goals of building trust and 
strengthening voluntary tax compliance, 
focusing on equitable enforcement and 
broader principles of transparency and 
accountability. Donors need to beware of 
creating perverse incentives, for example 
by focusing too narrowly on total revenue 
collection which can generate incentives for 
short-term and coercive forms of collection. 
They should invest in understanding local 
context, work with local reformers, and seek 
to engage where possible with local political 
priorities. Incremental reform may be the best 
strategy, especially in difﬁ cult environments.
Tax systems are shaped by 
the external environment
There are three main ways in which donors 
could improve the external environment for 
tax reform in developing countries. They 
should reduce proliferation of uncoordinated, 
potentially conﬂ icting interventions that create 
high transaction costs and undermine local 
policy and institutions. They should reduce or 
eliminate tax exemptions for aid funded goods 
and services which reduce revenue, are 
costly to administer and open to abuse, and 
may undermine the norm of tax compliance 
if exemptions are perceived as evidence of 
donors operating double standards. Finally they 
should advocate for more ambitious reform 
of offshore ﬁ nancial centres (or tax havens) 
which allow elite individuals and multinational 
corporations to evade tax. Evasion reduces 
overall levels of tax collection; increases 
inequality, thus undermining voluntary 
compliance; fragments taxpayer interests 
thus reducing the potential for effective tax 
bargaining; and facilitates corruption.
Implications for policymakers
In summary, the paper suggests seven guiding 
principles for design of donor support to tax 
reform:
• support local leadership of reform efforts;
• incorporate political economy analysis into 
the design and implementation of programmes;
• design tax reform programmes to foster 
broader linkages between taxation, state 
building and governance;
• pay attention to the complexity of the 
relationship between aid and tax effort;
• improve design of tax-related conditionality 
and performance indicators;
• coordinate donor interventions more effectively;
• pay greater attention to the international 
policy context and its impact on local tax 
systems.
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